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THE LIMITS OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
MARKETS IN CLIMATE-CHANGE 
LAW 
Noah M. Sachs* 
This Article examines whether market-based policies, deployed 
in many areas of environmental law, should be harnessed to promote 
energy efficiency. Several countries in Europe and Asia have experi-
mented with this new approach to energy efficiency, establishing 
markets that involve mandatory energy savings targets for firms and 
inter-firm trading of certificates that represent quantified energy sav-
ings. Many analysts contend that these new markets can unlock over-
looked opportunities for energy efficiency improvements and could 
be a critical policy tool for addressing climate change. 
After describing the rationale for these new markets and their 
operation in other countries, this Article concludes that the growing 
international support for energy efficiency markets is misplaced. I ar-
gue that market enthusiasts are overlooking problems of institutional 
design that complicate and weaken this new application of market 
principles in environmental law, and I demonstrate that energy effi-
ciency markets face several hurdles that are likely to limit their role in 
climate change mitigation. The hurdles include accurately verifying 
energy savings, setting environmentally meaningful savings targets, 
and preventing what I call energy savings “leakage,” in which firms 
participating in the markets outsource energy intensive parts of their 
operations to non-regulated firms. These limits of energy efficiency 
markets call into question long-held assumptions about the superiori-
ty of market-based approaches in environmental law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s, governments have deployed market-based policies 
in nearly every area of environmental law: from fisheries management 
and air pollution control to wetlands protection and greenhouse gas re-
duction programs.1 These policies, which encourage changes in the be-
havior of firms through price signals rather than through regulatory 
mandates or pollution limits,2 have attracted wide support among poli-
cymakers and scholars. As Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad have ex-
plained, “the superiority of market-based instruments has developed into 
a virtual orthodoxy” in environmental policy circles, and advocates of 
market-based policies have “capture[d] the high ground in policy de-
bates.”3 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can Do 
to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 282–83 (2005) (describing the shift from “behavior-based” 
controls on individual firms to market-based approaches); Richard Schmalensee & Robert Stavins, 
Lessons Learned from Three Decades of Experience with Cap and Trade (Res. for the Future, Discus-
sion Paper 15-51, 2015), available at http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-DP-15-51.pdf (discuss-
ing market-based approaches to air pollution and greenhouse gas control). 
 2. Robert N. Stavins & Bradley W. Whitehead, The Next Generation of Market-Based Envi-
ronmental Policies 3 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 97-10, 1996), available at http:// 
rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-97-10.pdf.  
 3. Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, Prescriptive Environmental Regulations Versus Market-
Based Incentives, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 4–5 (Jody Freeman & 
Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007).  
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Energy efficiency policy has long been an exception to this trend. 
Since the oil crises of the 1970s, energy efficiency law has been dominat-
ed by prescriptive government regulations such as minimum perfor-
mance standards for appliances and minimum average fuel economy 
standards for cars and trucks,4 supplemented by information disclosure 
requirements such as product labeling.5 This traditional approach, though 
criticized in some quarters for being overly bureaucratic and reducing 
consumer choice,6 has been remarkably effective in saving fuel and re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions.7 In prior work, I argued for an expan-
sion of energy efficiency regulation in the United States.8  
Improving energy efficiency—that is, reducing the amount of ener-
gy consumed to produce the goods and services of modern economies—
is one of the most important steps that governments can take to address 
climate change.9 As the United States and governments around the world 
consider new approaches to energy efficiency, this Article addresses 
whether market-based policies should replace or supplement the tradi-
tional regulatory framework. Could energy savings be quantified, pack-
aged, and traded among firms, just as firms now trade carbon dioxide 
emissions allowances and fishing quotas? What would we gain by turning 
energy savings into a tradable commodity? And how would such trading 
markets contribute to climate change goals? 
These questions are not just theoretical, as several governments are 
already operating energy efficiency markets. France and Italy established 
such markets a decade ago to reduce electricity and gas consumption,10 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. See Noah M. Sachs, Can We Regulate Our Way to Energy Efficiency? Product Standards as 
Climate Policy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1631 (2012) (providing an overview of energy efficiency regulations 
in the United States and the European Union); see also WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, WORLD ENERGY 
PERSPECTIVE: ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT 45 (2013), avail-
able at https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/World_Energy_Perspective_Energy-
Efficiency-Policies-2013_Full_Report.pdf (describing regulatory approaches to energy efficiency); Mir-
jam Harmelink et al., Theory-Based Policy Evaluation of 20 Energy Efficiency Instruments, 1 ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 131 (2008) (examining policy instruments used in the United States, Europe, and Japan).  
 5. See Karen Palmer & Margaret Walls, Can Benchmarking and Disclosure Laws Provide In-
centives for Energy Efficiency Improvements in Buildings? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 15-
09, 2015) available at http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-15-09.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regu-
lations, 43 J. REG. ECON. 248 (2013). 
 7. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that its efficiency regulations issued 
since 1987 for equipment such as refrigerators and air conditioners will avoid seven billion tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions through 2030. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SAVING ENERGY AND MONEY 
THROUGH APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT STANDARDS (2015), available at http://energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/2015/02/f19/equipment_standards_factsheet_updated_Feb_11_2015.pdf. 
 8. Sachs, supra note 4.  
 9. MCKINSEY & CO., ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A COMPELLING GLOBAL RESOURCE 2 (2010) (not-
ing that energy efficiency represents about forty percent of the greenhouse gas reduction potential that 
can be achieved for less than sixty euros per ton); John C. Dernbach et al., Energy Efficiency and Con-
servation: New Legal Tools and Opportunities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2011, at 7; Noah M. 
Sachs, Greening Demand: Energy Consumption and U.S. Climate Policy, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 295 (2009).  
 10. For information about France’s energy efficiency market, see INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, Mar-
ket Trends and Medium-Term Prospects, 2013 ENERGY MARKET REP 142–143, available at http:// 
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EEMR2013_free.pdf. For Italy, see 
NATHANLIE SABBATUCCI & NICOLA LABANCE, CHANGE BEST, TASK 2.1: NATIONAL REPORT ON THE 
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and India established a market in 2012 to improve industrial energy effi-
ciency.11 Although the theory of tradable permits originated in the Unit-
ed States,12 the United States has not established a market for energy ef-
ficiency, and the markets operating abroad have received little attention 
here. 
The new energy efficiency markets are a legal hybrid. They involve 
a government-established, mandatory energy savings target for an indus-
try or individual firm, coupled with trading among firms of Energy Sav-
ings Certificates (“ESCerts”). ESCerts are government-issued certificates 
that purport to certify that a firm has achieved a certain amount of ener-
gy savings.13 In the trading market, firms that can surpass their own ener-
gy savings target will become sellers of the ESCerts, while firms that fall 
short of their target are obligated to purchase ESCerts from the better-
performing firms. In theory, the trading price of the ESCert should pro-
vide an incentive for firms to undertake investments in energy efficient 
equipment and practices that they otherwise would have overlooked.14 
While few American scholars have studied these markets, interna-
tional scholarship, written mainly by economists and energy policy ana-
lysts, has been enthusiastic,15 echoing the broad scholarly support for 
tradable permit programs in other areas of environmental law.16 Scholars 
have contended that energy efficiency markets create flexibility for firms, 
provide continuing incentives to save energy, and achieve a given 
amount of energy savings (or efficiency improvement) at lower cost than 
traditional, prescriptive approaches to energy efficiency.17 They have 
                                                                                                                                      
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SERVICE BUSINESS IN ITALY 9 (2009), available at http://www.fire-
italia.org/prova/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Task2_1_Italy_Final.pdf. 
 11. Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 10, at 166. 
 12. The theory of issuing tradable property rights for pollution control and resource allocation 
can be traced to Ronald Coase’s landmark article, The Problem of Social Cost, and to later work by 
Baumol and Oates. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); William J. 
Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment, 73 
SWED. J. ECON. 42 (1971).  
 13. JAN HAMRIN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY 
SAVINGS CERTIFICATES (ESC) AS A MAJOR TOOL IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROGRAMS  i 
(2007). 
 14. See id. at 5; Edward Vine & Jan Hamrin, Energy Savings Certificates: A Market-Based Tool 
for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 467, 468 (2008). 
 15. See MONIQUE VOOGT ET AL., ECOFYS, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL CERTIFICATES SCHEMES, http://www.ewc.polimi.it/dl.php?file=Report%20on%20 
certificate%20trading%20schemes.pdf (2014); Ole Langniss & Barbara Praetorius, How Much Market 
Do Market-Based Instruments Create? An Analysis for the Case of “White” Certificates, 34 ENERGY 
POL’Y 200 (2006); Luis Mundaca, Markets for Energy Efficiency: Exploring the Implications of an EU-
wide ‘Tradable White Certificate’ Scheme, 30 ENERGY ECON. 3016, 3021 (2008) [hereinafter Mundaca, 
Markets for Energy Efficiency]; Luis Mundaca, Transaction Costs of Tradable White Certificate 
Schemes: The Energy Efficiency Commitment as Case Study, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 4340, 4340 (2007) 
[hereinafter Mundaca, Transaction Costs]; Vlasis Oikonomou & Luis Mundaca, Tradable White Certif-
icate Schemes: What Can We Learn from Tradable Green Certificate Schemes?, 1 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
211, 211 (2008); Vlasis Oikonomou et al., An Ex-Ante Evaluation of a White Certificates Scheme in the 
Netherlands: A Case Study for the Household Sector, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 1147, 1147 (2007). 
 16. See Freeman & Kolstad, supra note 3. 
 17. See PAOLO BERTOLDI & SILVIA REZESSY, INST. FOR ENV’T AND SUSTAINABILITY, 
TRADABLE CERTIFICATES FOR ENERGY SAVINGS (WHITE CERTIFICATES): THEORY AND PRACTICE 
35 (2006), [hereinafter TRADABLE CERTIFICATES] available at http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energy 
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claimed that ESCert markets are a “breakthrough plan”18 that can “un-
lock energy saving potentials”19 and serve as a “market-based and credi-
ble accounting instrument” to achieve environmental goals.20 
After reviewing the experience with energy efficiency markets to 
date, I arrive at a contrary position, one that challenges the use of trada-
ble permits to promote energy efficiency. I conclude that there are per-
sistent, structural weaknesses in the current energy efficiency markets in 
Europe and India and that these weaknesses reveal overlooked dynamics 
in tradable permit programs. Advocates of energy efficiency markets are 
neglecting important issues of institutional design and governance, and 
my review raises questions about the environmental integrity of the mar-
kets, their oversight, and their ability to contribute to climate change mit-
igation. The transaction costs of energy efficiency markets are high, they 
are not easily scaled, and they have not appeared to promote technology 
innovation. While tradable permit programs have been successful in oth-
er areas of environmental law, they do not appear to be a good fit for 
promoting energy efficiency. 
Tradable permits appear to falter for energy efficiency because of 
the need to package energy savings—non-use of a resource—into a trad-
able commodity. In other environmental markets, participants trade 
items such as wetland acreage or renewable energy generation that can 
be directly measured or metered.21 But energy efficiency markets lack 
those direct measures, creating troubling uncertainty about whether the 
energy savings are real and whether environmental goals are actually be-
ing achieved. Because regulated entities can “game” complex ESCert 
trading systems, resulting in unwarranted credits, windfall profits, and 
undermining of environmental goals, governments should be cautious 
about embracing this form of market-oriented environmental policy. 
This Article identifies three major problems that undermine these 
new markets. First, energy efficiency markets struggle to ensure addi-
tionality. That is, regulators cannot ensure that the energy savings 
claimed by firms are real and additional to energy savings that would 
have occurred in the absence of the programs. Far from being a “break-
                                                                                                                                      
efficiency/sites/energyefficiency/files/white_cert_report_2006.pdf; Mundaca, Markets for Energy Effi-
ciency, supra note 15, at 3035; Luis Mundaca & Lena Neij, A Multi-Criteria Evaluation Framework for 
Tradable White Certificate Schemes, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4557, 4557–58 (2009); Vine & Hamrin, supra 
note 14, at 474–75; LOUIS-GAËTAN GIRAUDET & DOMINIQUE FINON, WHITE CERTIFICATE SCHEMES:
 THE STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF AN ADAPTIVE POLICY INSTRUMENT 8–10 (Centre Inter-
national de Recherches sur l’ Environnement et le Développement [C.I.R.E.D] Working Paper No. 
33-2011, 2011) (Fr.).  
 18. Lisa Margonelli, Toward an Energy Efficiency Trading System, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020801294.html. 
 19. See EUROWHITECERT PROJECT, WHITE CERTIFICATES: CONCEPT AND MARKET 
EXPERIENCES 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/ 
projects/documents/eurowhitecert_brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 20. Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 474.  
 21. See Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading Programs into New Are-
as of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 99–100 & n.97 (2000) (explaining that 
wetlands in a trading market can be traded for similar wetlands or for wetlands of the same acreage). 
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through plan” to save energy, efficiency markets may merely create “hot 
air” in energy efficiency,22 awarding firms valuable credits for ephemeral 
energy savings. 
Second, I show that the energy savings targets that governments 
have established for these markets have been unambitious, closely track-
ing business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency in the economy. 
Although nothing would prohibit a nation from setting more ambitious 
energy savings targets, I discuss a variety of political factors that militate 
against target stringency and show why lax targets appear to be common 
in many market-based environmental policies. With lax savings targets in 
most of the existing programs, the trading prices for ESCerts have re-
mained low, and the programs have not forced significant changes in the 
behavior of firms. 
Finally, I show that energy efficiency markets are prone to what I 
call energy savings “leakage,” similar to the well-known problem of car-
bon leakage in cap-and-trade programs.23 In energy savings leakage, 
firms participating in an energy efficiency market can outsource energy 
intensive parts of their operations to non–regulated firms, improving 
their paper record of energy savings without any actual savings of energy 
(and associated greenhouse gas emissions) in the jurisdiction. 
My skeptical view of energy efficiency markets contributes to a 
body of literature that questions the assumed superiority of market-
oriented approaches in environmental law.24 Recent scholarship has high-
lighted problems involving enforcement, target setting, permit allocation, 
and strategic gaming in a number of market-oriented environmental pro-
grams.25 I do not contend that all market-based policies are ineffective. 
Trading markets have performed well in areas such as air pollution con-
trol and wetlands protection.26 But it has become clear that trading mar-
                                                                                                                                      
 22. Hot air refers to emissions credits under the Kyoto Protocol that were granted to countries, 
primarily in Eastern Europe, whose emissions targets under the treaty were higher than their business-
as-usual emissions. Countries earned valuable emissions credits, tradable to other countries, without 
undertaking substantial domestic emissions reductions under the treaty. See Edwin Woerdman, Hot 
Air Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: An Environmental Problem or Not?, 14 EUROPEAN ENVTL L. 
REV. 71, 72–73 (2005).  
 23. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion: The Perils and Promise 
of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 359 (2013); Bernd G. Janzen, International Trade Law 
and the “Carbon Leakage” Problem: Are Unilateral U.S. Import Restrictions the Solution?, 8 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL. 22 (2008). 
 24. See, e.g., David Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & 
Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007); Margaret R. Taylor, Innovation Under Cap-and-Trade Programs, 109 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4804 (Mar. 27, 2012) (concluding that regulated firms actually decreased 
their research and development investments in pollution control after enactment of cap-and-trade 
programs because trading prices were lower than expected).  
 25. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge in Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 
ENVTL. L. 1195 (2010); Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem of Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 396 (2009) [hereinafter The Overallocation Problem]; J.B. 
Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Admin-
istrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 46–49 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cost Savings From Allowance Trading in the 1990 Clean Air 
Act: Estimates From a Choice-Based Model, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
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kets often fail to achieve their objectives and require far more govern-
ment oversight and intervention than market advocates recognize. They 
are simply not the right policy tool for every environmental goal, and 
they are not the right tool for promoting energy efficiency. 
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part II, I provide an overview of 
ESCert trading and discuss some of the key design choices that govern-
ments must make to establish an energy efficiency market. Part II is pri-
marily descriptive and outlines the regulatory framework for the mar-
kets. Part III explores the results of the major ESCert programs 
established to date, focusing on the programs in Europe and India. I 
show that the European programs have resulted in only modest energy 
savings and that India’s program, while potentially more ambitious in its 
design, has set lax energy efficiency targets in its early years of operation. 
Finally, in Part IV, I discuss some of the major problems with ESCert 
trading. Drawing on economic and legal literature on market-based ap-
proaches to environmental law, I demonstrate why the programs are 
plagued by problems of measurement, verification, and credibility. I con-
clude that adapting tradable permits to promote energy efficiency is not 
likely to contribute significantly to climate change goals. 
II. DESIGNING TRADING MARKETS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
To understand the dynamics of using tradable permits for energy ef-
ficiency, it is important to understand the rationale for the markets and 
how they operate. What are the legal and policy choices that undergird 
the markets? And why do advocates consider these markets to be a 
breakthrough for reducing energy consumption? In this Part, I address 
these questions by discussing energy efficiency markets from the stand-
point of institutional design. 
I proceed from the proposition, widely shared, that some govern-
ment intervention is necessary in energy markets. There is a massive lit-
erature that explains why markets for electricity, gas, and other fuels, as 
well as markets for energy efficient equipment, are prone to market bar-
riers and market failures, with the result that firms and households do 
not adopt energy efficient technologies and practices, even when doing 
so would be profitable.27 This suboptimal investment has been dubbed 
                                                                                                                                      
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad 
eds., 2007) (stating that sulfur dioxide allowance trading “has been remarkably successful to date”); 
Winston Harrington & Richard D. Morgenstern, International Experience with Competing Approaches 
to Environmental Policy: Results from Six Paired Cases, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad 
eds., 2007) (identifying successful use of market trading in air and water pollution control).  
 27. See Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers Within Firms to Energy-Efficient Investments, 21 ENERGY 
POL’Y 906, 908 (1993); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, MIND THE GAP: QUANTIFYING PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
PROBLEMS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 11 (2007), available at https://www.iea.org/publications/ 
freepublications/publication/mind_the_gap.pdf; Thomas Dietz, Narrowing the US Energy Efficiency 
Gap, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 16007, 16007 (2010); Carl C. Koopmans & Dirk Willern te 
Velde, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Using Bottom-up Information in a Top-Down Energy De-
mand Model, 23 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 57, 57 (2001); Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Energy 
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the “energy efficiency paradox” or “energy efficiency gap,”28 and it leads 
to over-consumption of climate-altering fossil fuels. The academic litera-
ture is virtually unanimous in advocating some government action to 
overcome these market barriers and market failures.29 The debate is 
about which mix of policy tools should be deployed. 
A. The Rationale for Energy Efficiency Markets 
The argument in favor of harnessing tradable permits for energy ef-
ficiency is that the trading will allow jurisdictions to reach a desired re-
duction in energy consumption while providing more flexibility to firms 
(and lower costs) than an equivalent governmental mandate. 
Assume, for example, that a jurisdiction aims to reduce energy con-
sumption by eight percent over five years. The government may view this 
reduction as important for reaching climate change goals or it may simp-
ly have few energy resources of its own and wants to reduce fuel imports. 
Assume further that two firms dominate the energy consumption in the 
jurisdiction. Firm A can achieve more than an eight percent energy sav-
ings in its operations with minor capital investments, while Firm B needs 
to make significant capital investments to achieve an eight percent sav-
ings. 
A market in tradable ESCerts would allow Firm A, which has the 
capability to surpass its target, to sell the resulting ESCerts to Firm B to 
make up its shortfall, equalizing the marginal cost of compliance between 
the firms and lowering the overall cost of the program. In some trading 
markets, non–obligated actors (those that do not themselves have a gov-
ernment-mandated energy savings target) are allowed to participate in 
the trading markets.30 Consider Firm C, a manufacturer that can docu-
ment energy savings from overhauling an existing process line. Regula-
tors might award an ESCert to Firm C, which can then sell it to Firm B, 
the larger, underperforming obliged firm in the program. 
                                                                                                                                      
Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology, 16 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 91, 98–99 
(1994); John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 5 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
Market barriers that hinder investment include lack of access to capital, long payback periods, lack of 
management attention to energy costs, and search costs. See Jaffe & Stavins, supra; Michael P. Van-
denbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1755 
(2008). Moreover, externalities from energy production and consumption are not fully incorporated 
into energy prices, leading to market failure. Todd D. Gerarden et al., An Assessment of the Energy-
Efficiency Gap and Its Implications for Climate-Change Policy (Nat’l Bureau for Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20905, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20905.pdf; W. Kip Viscusi 
et al., Environmentally Responsible Energy Pricing, 15 ENERGY J. 23, 24 (1994) (stating that one po-
tential use of energy taxes is to internalize environmental externalities into energy prices). 
 28. See Gerarden et al., supra note 27.  
 29. See supra notes 22, 27. 
 30. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-
Trade System Performance, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2010). 
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ESCert markets are offset markets.31 By purchasing an ESCert from 
another firm that has achieved energy savings elsewhere, a firm can off-
set a portion of its own energy savings mandate. The ESCert itself is a 
government-issued certificate (or electronic equivalent) that purports to 
certify that a firm has achieved a certain amount of energy savings. Typi-
cally denominated as savings of megawatt-hours of electricity or savings 
of tons of oil equivalent (“toe”),32 an ESCert is both an accounting tool 
and a tradable property right with fluctuating value in the marketplace. 
There are other policy tools, of course, that might also incentivize 
firms to reduce energy consumption. The government could raise energy 
taxes, for example, but energy tax increases are unpopular and regres-
sive. Energy taxes, moreover, provide price signals to firms but cannot 
guarantee any particular quantity of energy savings, whereas energy effi-
ciency markets are quantity-based instruments that attempt to lock in a 
particular energy savings goal (or a specific improvement in energy effi-
ciency).33 
According to advocates, flexibility is one of the most important ad-
vantages of the markets. Not only can firms choose whether they want to 
be buyers or sellers of ESCerts, but those who choose to be sellers can 
also choose which technological upgrades or changes in production prac-
tices they will adopt to conserve energy.34 No government agency dictates 
the exact technologies or practices that firms must adopt. 
The ability to package energy savings into a tradable ESCert 
should, in theory, incentivize investments in energy efficient equipment 
that might otherwise be overlooked. If a firm concludes, for example, 
that an investment in highly efficient boilers, motors, or refrigeration 
equipment has a seven-year pay-back period, the accompanying sale of 
ESCerts from the energy savings might shorten the pay-back period to 
five years, motivating the firm to undertake the investment.35 In this way, 
advocates argue, ESCerts can “change mindsets” by making business 
managers focus on energy efficiency opportunities they may otherwise 
overlook.36 
Advocates also point to the scalability of ESCert programs as one of 
their most attractive features.37 While traditional policy tools in energy 
efficiency aim at particular product categories, such as automobiles or re-
frigerators, energy efficiency markets might involve whole industries or 
even entire cities, states, or regions. Indeed, one could envision a system 
                                                                                                                                      
 31. See Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights 
Revolution, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 391 (2012) (defining and criticizing offset mechanisms).  
 32. See BARRY FRIEDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
EMERGING MARKETS FOR ENERGY SAVINGS CERTIFICATES 6 (2008). 
 33. See GIRAUDET & FINON, supra note 17, at 5. 
 34. See Mundaca & Neij, supra note 17, at 4557 (noting that the program’s grant obliged parties 
“extensive flexibility,” which is “crucial because it allows market actors to decide how to meet their 
targets cost-effectively.”).  
 35. See Margonelli, supra note 18, at 30. 
 36. See, e.g., BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 17. 
 37. See id. 
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where any actor could locate an energy efficiency improvement, under-
take it or fund it, and then “package” the resulting quantified energy sav-
ings into an ESCert, tradable to some other party obliged to find savings 
under the program. The trading could be cross-industry and even cross-
border. 
In this expansive vision of some market advocates, efficiency mar-
kets could be harnessed to reduce energy consumption in industry, resi-
dences, commercial and government buildings, and even transportation 
networks.38 Participants in the markets could theoretically include not on-
ly major industries, but also millions of small businesses, transportation 
providers, property owners, and even individuals.39 Each would be moti-
vated by the sale price of ESCerts to locate opportunities for energy sav-
ings and undertake efficiency improvements in any area of the econo-
my.40 
Clearly, the expectations for what energy efficiency markets can ac-
complish are quite high. But this expansive vision—that market trading 
can unlock otherwise overlooked energy efficiency improvements and 
thereby significantly reduce energy consumption throughout the econo-
my—is based on a number of assumptions that are not realistic. The vi-
sion assumes, for example, that ESCert prices will materially affect firms’ 
investment decisions, that firms in fact have divergent marginal costs to 
achieve the energy savings target set by the government, and that an ES-
Cert represents actual energy savings that would not have occurred in 
the absence of the program. 
As I detail later in this Article, many of these assumptions are ques-
tionable, and the reality of designing and operating these markets on the 
ground is quite different from the theoretical vision of market propo-
nents. 
B. Making the Market 
Creating a trading market for energy efficiency is a multi-step pro-
cess with numerous challenges of institutional design. Not only must a 
government create a new property right in quantified energy savings, but 
it also must monitor and verify the energy savings to ensure that the 
credits it issues reflect real reductions in energy consumption. Govern-
ments must also make a number of preliminary decisions regarding the 
actors to be obligated under the program and the structure of the mar-
                                                                                                                                      
 38. See id. 
 39. EUROPEAN COMMISSION INTELLIGENT ENERGY PROGRAMME, WORK PACKAGE 3.3., 
WHITE CERTIFICATES AND INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS 6 (2007) (noting that 
the energy savings that back an ESCert can “in principle – be realised anywhere”); JOE LOPER ET AL., 
ENERGY SAVINGS CREDITS: ARE POTENTIAL BENEFITS BEING REALIZED? ALLIANCE TO SAVE 
ENERGY 13 (2010) [hereinafter ENERGY SAVINGS CREDITS] (noting that the variety of actors who 
“could have an interest in developing their own energy efficiency initiatives, earning ESCs for the sav-
ings and selling the ESCs to the regulated entities.”).  
 40. Margonelli, supra note 18 (advocating that the United States should create a national energy 
efficiency market that encompasses utilities and the transportation sector). 
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ket.Creating an energy efficiency market usually involves four founda-
tional steps: 
1. Determining the Obliged Actors 
The first step is to determine which industries or firms will become 
obliged under the program. Two basic market models have emerged.41 
In the first model, prevalent in Europe, the firms subject to energy 
savings targets are energy suppliers and/or distributors. They earn ES-
Certs by performing small-scale, geographically dispersed energy effi-
ciency upgrades in homes and businesses (which tend to underinvest in 
efficiency on their own).42 For example, utilities might subsidize energy 
efficient thermostats for their customers or assist in the installation of 
residential insulation. In many countries, utilities have conducted these 
kinds of efficiency upgrades for decades under utility Demand Side 
Management (“DSM”) obligations.43 The ESCert trading markets are 
touted as a mechanism to aggregate the energy savings achieved in small 
increments in individual buildings, allowing utilities to reach their DSM 
obligations at lower cost. 44 
Under the second model, used in India, the firms subject to the en-
ergy savings targets are energy end-users, typically large industrial firms 
in industries such as steel, concrete, and aluminum.45 The goal of this 
market model is industrial energy efficiency improvement, and geo-
graphically, the energy efficiency upgrades are highly localized within the 
fence-lines of particular industrial plants.46 Firms are expected to find en-
ergy efficiency improvements within their own operations, or they must 
purchase ESCerts from better-performing firms if they fall short of their 
target.47 
There are some clear trade-offs in the choice of obliged parties. Un-
der the first model, only a handful of firms need to be regulated and 
overseen, and these firms (energy suppliers and distributors) are already 
subject to some governmental regulation.48 The energy suppliers and dis-
                                                                                                                                      
 41. See Paolo Bertoldi et al., Where to Place the Saving Obligation: Energy End-Users or Suppli-
ers?, 63 ENERGY POL’Y 328, 335–36 (2013) [hereinafter Where to Place the Saving Obligation] (discuss-
ing how the choice of obliged parties affects program structure). 
 42. See id. at 336 (“[R]esidential end-users face additional barriers (technical, market, infor-
mation etc.) to initiate energy efficiency projects and are often unaware or not interested in the eco-
nomic benefits involved.”).  
 43. See Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets, 24 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 259, 265–67 (2006) (discussing different types of DSM measures). 
 44. See JAN HAMRIN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY 
SAVINGS CERTIFICATES (ESC) AS A MAJOR TOOL IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROGRAMS 2 
(2007). 
 45. Where to Place the Savings Obligation, supra note 41, at 333. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. In Italy, for example, more than half of the energy savings obligation was placed on a single 
firm, ENEL, Italy’s largest electricity provider. See MIKAEL TOGEBY ET AL., DESIGN OF WHITE 
CERTIFICATES: COMPARING UK, ITALY, FRANCE, AND DENMARK 17 (2007). Similarly, France placed 
nearly eighty percent of the required energy savings obligation on two firms, Energie de France and 
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tributors act as a leverage point through which the program promotes 
energy efficiency upgrades in a large number of residential and commer-
cial properties. Because of the geographic breadth of these programs and 
the number of properties involved, this model for an energy efficiency 
market tends to incentivize utilities to deploy relatively cheap, off-the-
shelf technologies capable of mass replication. Utilities may, for example, 
distribute millions of compact fluorescent light bulbs, upgrade insulation 
in residences, or replace showerheads.49 More complicated practices or 
technologies that might offer greater energy savings, such as changes in 
building siting or design, tend to get overlooked.50 
In the second model aimed at industrial energy efficiency, each 
obliged firm has a direct incentive to improve its own energy efficiency. 
For example, a steel plant might be given the target of improving the en-
ergy efficiency of its own operations by five percent over five years. This 
market model puts a much wider range of technologies and practices in 
play to save energy within the confines of individual facilities. To achieve 
the government-set target, one firm might choose to invest in state-of-
the-art boilers or air conditioning, while another might choose to make 
changes in its production line or use different raw materials that require 
less processing on site. Under this model, ESCerts can be traded across 
industry sectors. An inefficient chemical plant, for example, might pur-
chase ESCerts from a highly efficient steel plant to achieve its target un-
der the program. 
While the options to improve energy efficiency within a firm are 
nearly limitless in this second model, there are also greatly increased 
transaction costs involved in verifying energy savings in diverse firms 
throughout an economy, rather than overseeing a handful of energy sup-
pliers and distributers. 
2. Defining the Property Right 
Once the obliged entities are identified, the next step in an ESCert 
program is to create and define a tradable property right. Energy effi-
ciency markets are often compared to other market-based environmental 
programs, such as cap-and-trade programs for pollution control or trada-
ble fishing permit schemes, but there is an important difference. In those 
programs, the property right established by the government is typically a 
right to emit a certain amount of pollutant or a right to use a certain 
amount of a natural resource.51 The items traded can be metered or 
measured. 
                                                                                                                                      
Gas de France. See EOIN LEES, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, FRENCH WHITE CERTIFICATES 
AND ENERGY SAVINGS IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 1 (2014), available at www.raponline. 
org/document/download/id/7159. 
 49. PAOLO BERTOLDI & SILVIA REZESSY, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENERGY SAVING 
OBLIGATIONS AND TRADABLE WHITE CERTIFICATES 25 (2009). 
 50. Id.  
 51. See MARGHERITA COLANGELO, CREATING PROPERTY RIGHTS: LAW AND REGULATION OF 
SECONDARY TRADING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1–32 (2012); see also Carol M. Rose, Expanding the 
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The property right for an ESCert program, on the other hand, is 
unusual. It is a right to own and trade a quantified level of energy sav-
ings. The property right accrues to firms that achieve non-use of the val-
uable resource that the program is trying to conserve. Governments cal-
culate this non-use (and the number of ESCerts to be issued) by 
comparing the amount of energy the regulated firm actually consumed 
(or its customers consumed, in the case of utilities) against a hypothetical 
baseline of energy consumption that would likely have occurred in the 
absence of the program.52 
Because of the need to calculate non-use of a resource to define the 
property right, ESCert programs are far more complex than a typical 
tradable-permit program. Instead, ESCert markets more closely resem-
ble other offset markets such as the UN’s Clean Development Mecha-
nism (“CDM”). The CDM is a prime example of the measurement, veri-
fication, and credibility problems that offset markets encounter. 
Established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the CDM aims to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries.53 Under the 
CDM, an Executive Board determines the number of emissions reduc-
tion credits that it will award to a project developer by estimating the 
greenhouse gas emissions from a project over its lifespan (which may be 
zero in the case of a solar or wind power project) and comparing those 
emissions to the larger, hypothetical “baseline” emissions (such as those 
from a fossil-fuel generating plant) that would otherwise have occurred 
over that same time.54 The CDM, like most offset markets, relies heavily 
on estimation and projections to determine the avoided emissions of 
greenhouse gases and the resulting amount of credits to be awarded.55 
The program has been heavily criticized for its inability to ensure that the 
credits represent true reductions in emissions.56 Problems of estimation, 
measurement, and verification similarly plague energy efficiency mar-
kets, and I return to this issue in Part IV. 
                                                                                                                                      
Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-
Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 45, 51 (1999) (analyzing com-
mon property regimes in pollution control and contrasting them with emission trading); Robert N. 
Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 293, 298 (2008) (describing distribution of allowances in a cap-and-trade system); Roy White-
head, Jr. et al., The Value of Private Water Rights: From A Legal and Economic Perspective, 9 ALB. L. 
ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 313, 333–34 (2004) (arguing that tradable fishing permits and transferable quotas, 
which limit the amount of catch, are preferable to maintaining fish as a common resource). For analy-
sis of allocations of individual fishing quotas, see Dallas DeLuca, One for Me and One for You: An 
Analysis of the Initial Allocation of Fishing Quotas, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 723 (2005). 
 52. For example, in the simplest form of a trading market, if a firm is projected to use X mega-
watt-hours of electricity in a given year, and it actually uses the lower amount Y megawatt-hours, it 
will be issued ESCerts equal to the difference of X and Y. It can then sell those ESCerts to underper-
forming firms that were unable to reach their energy savings targets. 
 53. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change Compliance: 
Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 44, 49 
(2008). 
 54. See id. at 49–51; TOM MOUNTEER, CLIMATE CHANGE DESKBOOK 25 (2009). 
 55. See JONATHAN ROBINSON, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE EU AND 
THE UK 43 (2007) (noting uncertainties involved in setting baselines). 
 56. See Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 53, at 49–51. 
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3. Target Setting and Verification 
Once the property right is defined, the next step in establishing an 
ESCert program is to set the energy savings or energy efficiency targets 
for the obliged firms. Setting the target involves an initial decision by the 
government about whether the program aims to save a fixed amount of 
energy compared to the status quo or instead aims to improve energy ef-
ficiency (energy used per unit of output of a single firm or per unit of 
GDP).57 In the latter case, the target may actually allow increases in en-
ergy consumption if output is rapidly growing, as in India.58 
Target setting involves a projection by the regulatory authority of 
economically feasible energy savings or efficiency improvements—those 
that are possible using available technology, with reasonable costs for 
regulated firms. For example, France established a target for its energy 
efficiency market of 345 terawatt-hours of energy savings between 2011 
and 2013.59 India set a target of a 5.88% improvement in efficiency in its 
steel industry between 2012 and 2015.60 Once national or industry-wide 
savings targets are established, regulators typically allocate the target to 
individual firms on the basis of market share or other criteria.61 
Finally, within each program cycle, the regulatory authority must 
determine whether each firm has surpassed its energy savings or energy 
efficiency target (and will be issued ESCerts) or has instead fallen short 
and will become obligated to purchase ESCerts. Governments often im-
pose an additional financial penalty on those firms that have failed to 
meet their targets. 
4. Creation of a Trading Platform 
There are innumerable ways to structure a trading market once reg-
ulators have issued ESCerts to firms. Some countries, such as France and 
Italy, have established relatively liquid exchanges, with a spot market in 
certificates.62 Others have allowed obliged parties to trade verified energy 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. See GIRAUDET & FINON, supra note 17, at 5. 
 58. SANJAY DUBE ET AL., EMERGENT VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, CAN THE LEARNINGS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES MAKE THE ‘PERFORM ACHIEVE AND TRADE (PAT) SCHEME’ PERFORM 
BETTER FOR INDIA 2 (2011). 
 59. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, BEST PRACTICES IN DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY OBLIGATION SCHEMES 49 (June 2012), available at http://www.raponline.org/ 
event/designing-and-implementing-energy-efficiency-obligation. 
 60. ABHA SHUKLA, BUREAU OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, PERFORM, ACHIEVE & TRADE (PAT) 
(NATIONAL MISSION FOR ENHANCED ENERGY EFFICIENCY) 8, available at http://www.iea.org/ 
media/workshops/2011/emak-november/1.abhashukla_bee.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 61. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 59, at 4–5. In establishing an ESCert mar-
ket, regulators could announce a series of targets and timetables all at once, allowing firms to plan 
their investments in energy efficiency over a decade or more. Alternatively, governments may set the 
energy savings targets sequentially, reacting to the trading price of ESCerts and to market conditions. 
See, e.g., BERTOLDI & REZESSY, ENERGY SAVING OBLIGATIONS AND TRADABLE WHITE 
CERTIFICATES, supra note 49, at 8 (noting that “[a]nnual targets give the system administrator the pos-
sibility to correct for any implementation flaws.”). 
 62. Luis Alberto Mundaca Toro, Markets for Energy Efficiency: Exploring the New Horizons of 
Tradable Certificate Schemes 78 (Sept. 2008) (doctoral dissertation, Lund University). 
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savings through bilateral contracts, without issuance of certificates.63 The 
ESCerts themselves need to be tracked by regulators so that once a firm 
uses them for compliance purposes, the certificate is retired and cannot 
be used again.64 Regulators may impose price floors or ceilings to avoid 
wide fluctuations in the trading price and provide some market certainty 
to participants.65 They may establish specialized exchanges for ESCerts 
or rely on an existing exchange. 
Theoretically, the certified energy savings represented by an ESCert 
could be converted to a measure of avoided greenhouse gas emissions. 
Once energy savings are expressed in terms of a fungible unit, such as 
tons of oil equivalent, it is a straightforward process to convert the ener-
gy savings into the number of tons of avoided greenhouse gas emissions.66 
ESCert markets could then be linked to other, parallel carbon markets, 
such as the EU’s Emissions Trading System. No country has allowed this 
interlinking of ESCert markets with other markets, however, due to dif-
ficulties of monitoring and verification in the ESCert markets. 
The four-step process outlined here demonstrates the high degree 
of governmental involvement that is needed to establish and oversee en-
ergy efficiency markets. Although these are ostensibly “market-based” 
policies, the real work of an ESCert trading market is accomplished by 
the governmental mandate to reduce energy consumption (or the man-
date to improve energy efficiency). The trading market is best viewed as 
an adjunct to that regulatory mandate, allowing increased flexibility for 
firms and potentially lowering the cost of compliance. The ESCert trad-
ing market, once established, also needs continuing governmental over-
sight to verify that claimed energy savings have actually occurred. 
Advocates of market-based approaches in environmental law tend 
to underestimate the degree of government standard setting, supervision, 
and enforcement that is needed to run effective market-based pro-
grams.67 But as is clear from this discussion of the design of an energy ef-
                                                                                                                                      
 63. The United Kingdom’s efficiency program operated under this model from 2002–2012. See 
Paolo Bertoldi et al., Energy Supplier Obligations and White Certificate Schemes: Comparative Analy-
sis of Experiences in the European Union, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1455, 1463, 1466 (2010) [hereinafter En-
ergy Supplier Obligations] (stating that during the first two periods, EEC-1 and EEC-2, trading oc-
curred bilaterally, and during the third period, CERT, that ran from 2008 until 2012, energy savings 
were also traded only between obligated parties). 
 64. See ENERGY SAVINGS CREDITS, supra note 39, at 8–9. 
 65. A price ceiling would limit the risk that ESCert prices would exceed acceptable levels, while 
a price floor would ensure that there would be some financial incentive for firms to surpass their effi-
ciency targets. Both instruments have been advocated for cap-and-trade programs. See Robert W. 
Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 557, 579–80 (2009) 
(suggesting that a price ceiling can be used to mitigate “politically unacceptable price increases,” while 
a price floor can “stimulate innovation in emissions reductions by assuring that greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions will fetch a positive price.”); Peter John Wood & Frank Jotzo, Price Floors for Emis-
sions Trading, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1746, 1746–48 (2011). 
 66. If energy savings are instead expressed in megawatt-hours, some conversion factor would 
need to be applied (based on the electric generating mix in the jurisdiction) to convert these units into 
an estimate of avoided greenhouse gas emissions. 
 67. See David Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the 
Command and Control / Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 296–311 (1998) 
[hereinafter Emissions Trading]. 
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ficiency market, a strong governmental hand is needed at every stage of 
the process, and there are substantial transaction costs in the programs. 
As two scholars concluded with respect to ESCert markets, the programs 
are “rather demanding with respect to design and operation of the sys-
tem.”68 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
MARKETS 
With ESCert programs being touted as a next-generation, climate-
change-mitigation policy, and with many analysts suggesting that energy 
efficiency markets should be expanded in the United States, it is im-
portant to examine the experience with these markets to date.69 In this 
Part, I assess the major energy efficiency markets that have been estab-
lished in Europe and in India.70 India’s Perform Achieve Trade (“PAT”) 
program is still nascent.71 Because there is no data on the performance of 
PAT, my review of the Indian program focuses on some of the regulatory 
design choices made by Indian regulators in establishing the program. 
A. The European Experience with Energy Efficiency Markets 
Energy efficiency markets involving tradable ESCerts (also called 
“White Certificates” or “White Tags” in Europe) are currently operating 
in France, Italy, and Denmark.72 The United Kingdom operated a form 
of energy efficiency market, involving bilateral contracts among utilities 
rather than fully tradable certificates, from 2002 to 2012, but it has now 
ended the program in favor of a larger package of greenhouse-gas-
emissions-reductions efforts.73 
                                                                                                                                      
 68. Nicola Labanca & Adriaan Perrels, Editorial: Tradable White Certificates—A Promising but 
Tricky Policy Instrument, 1 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 233, 234 (2008); see also Vine & Hamrin, supra note 
14, at 475 (concluding that the “most important issue” with tradable energy efficiency certificates “is 
the problem of transaction costs”).  
 69. See Labanca & Perrels, supra note 68, at 235 (“[T]he recent proliferation of certificate-based 
energy-saving obligation programmes start to provide a growing base of empirical material concerning 
[certificate] scheme implementation and operation.”) (citation omitted).  
 70. Outside of Europe and India, energy efficiency markets have been established on a small 
scale by the Australian states of New South Wales and Victoria, and by the U.S. state of Connecticut. 
For discussion of the Australian programs, see Regina Betz, The Australian Energy Efficiency 
Schemes, Presentation Held at the European Workshop on Experiences and Policies on Energy Sav-
ing Obligations and White Certificates (Jan. 27–28, 2011). For an overview of energy efficiency trading 
program in New South Wales, see Slobodan Perdan & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon Trading: Current 
Schemes and Future Developments, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 6040, 6045 (2011). For discussion of energy effi-
ciency trading program in Connecticut, see Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 471. 
 71. Ritu Gupta, Get Ready to Perform, and Then Earn, 1 FIN. VISION 39, 39 (2013); Ragini 
Bhuyan, Can Market Mechanisms Help India Fight Climate Change?, LIVE MINT (Apr. 10, 2016), 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/nuk1yqmbZLj6foZY1kzh2I/Can-market-mechanisms-help-India-
fight-climate-change.html (describing the results of beginning of ESCert trading). 
 72. See TOGEBY ET AL., supra note 48, at 4. 
 73. Energy Supplier Obligations, supra note 63, at 1463; Where to Place the Saving Obligation, 
supra note 41, at 332. 
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While some studies of the energy efficiency markets in Europe have 
concluded that they have overall net monetary benefits,74 it cannot be de-
termined whether those benefits came from the market trading compo-
nent of these programs or from the underlying governmental mandates 
to major utilities to reduce energy consumption in their service areas. 
There is evidence to suggest that the trading component of these pro-
grams has not significantly contributed to their environmental goals. In 
the early years of these programs, for example, the energy savings targets 
were quite modest, trading volumes were low, and it is clear that the 
markets had a negligible impact on greenhouse gas emissions. According 
to a 2009 European Commission study, for example, the energy savings 
targets adopted by the UK, Italy, and France for their utilities represent-
ed only 0.6%, 0.3%, and 0.14% of the total annual energy consumption 
in those countries, respectively.75 
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the European experi-
ence with ESCert trading. First, it is clear that the utilities that partici-
pate in the programs have been able to reach their energy savings targets 
fairly easily, which suggests unambitious target setting by the national 
governments. The European Commission reported, for example, that 
“over-compliance has been observed in all the existing schemes in the 
EU, which . . . signals unimposing targets in comparison to economic sav-
ing potential.”76 In France, the two big energy retailers subject to the 
program were both able to surpass their energy savings targets, achieving 
120.7% of their assigned target at a cost equal to one fifth the penalty 
had they not achieved it.77 Similarly, in the United Kingdom and Italy, 
nearly all the obliged participants in the program reached or surpassed 
their savings targets.78 
Given that the market participants regularly exceeded their energy 
savings targets on their own, the market trading aspect of the programs 
was largely superfluous (there were many sellers and few buyers of ES-
Certs). The underlying energy savings mandates, not market trading, 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. See Mundaca & Neij, supra note 17, at 4561, 4569 (evaluating emissions trading in Great 
Britain and observing high energy-saving effectiveness, but cautioning against generalizations or com-
parative international assertions); Mundaca, Markets for Energy Efficiency, supra note 15, at 3035, 
3037–38 (analyzing European trading schemes and whether an EU-wide scheme should be adopted); 
Oikonomou et al., supra note 15, at 1160–61 (analyzing tradable certificates schemes in Great Britain 
and Italy, and advocating them for the Netherlands); Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 469 (stating 
that the overall energy savings targets for Italy’s electricity distribution sector have been achieved). 
 75. Mundaca & Neij, supra note 17, at 4561. 
 76. BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 49, at 49.  
 77. See LEES, supra note 48, at 2. In France, traded certificates represented less than 1% of all 
the energy savings mandated in the program. See Where to Place the Saving Obligation, supra note 41, 
at 329. Trading has been more active in Italy, but only because projects are undertaken by a variety of 
energy service providers, who then sell the ESCerts to the obliged utilities. See BERTOLDI & REZESSY, 
supra note 49, at 15, 23. One analyst has suggested that the reason trading has been active in Italy is 
that various energy efficiency equipment installers have been claiming credits for efficiency upgrades 
in homes and offices that they were performing anyway. See Mundaca & Neij, supra note 17, at 4562. 
These installers have then been trading those credits to the obliged utilities. Id. 
 78. See BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 49, at 15. 
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drove the participating firms to build or fund energy efficiency upgrades 
in their service areas. 
A second lesson from the European experience is that features de-
signed to reduce transaction costs in energy efficiency markets can have 
the effect of reducing the ambition of the programs. The European mar-
kets rely heavily on an ex ante, “deemed savings” approach to energy 
measurement and verification.79 In this approach, energy regulators simp-
ly “deem,” or credit, a specified amount of energy savings when electric 
and gas utilities implement energy-saving techniques for their residential 
and commercial customers.80 This reduces transaction costs because no 
auditor has to conduct field checks on an ex post basis to measure the ac-
tual energy savings. In France, for example, utilities can choose from a 
menu of over 100 projects listed in the regulations, with associated 
“deemed” energy savings for each.81 
As a result of this approach, the European energy efficiency mar-
kets have prompted increased spending and deployment of a wide range 
of off-the-shelf energy efficiency upgrades, such as upgrading insulation 
or distributing energy efficient light bulbs.82 But there is no evidence that 
ESCert trading has led to transformational improvements in the energy 
efficiency of products, equipment, or materials. By standardizing the pos-
sible energy efficiency upgrades under the programs, governments can 
reduce transaction costs, but the result is that investments are directed 
“towards energy savings measures with the lowest cost, thereby deterring 
investments in projects that may have greater up-front costs, or longer 
payback periods, but would achieve potentially greater or broader ener-
gy savings.”83 
A third major lesson from Europe is that ESCert trading makes 
sense only if firms obliged under the program in fact have varying mar-
ginal costs to achieve energy savings. If all firms have nearly identical 
marginal cost curves, then it makes little sense to enact a tradable permit 
program.84 Yet because the European programs rely heavily on a stand-
ardized menu of possible energy efficiency upgrades, the marginal com-
pliance costs of obliged parties are likely to be similar. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the participating utilities all hired the same set of 
subcontractors to make insulation and lighting upgrades in residences, so 
there was not likely to be a wide variation in their costs.85 Of course, we 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 469–71; BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 49, at 22.  
 80. See Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 471. 
 81. Energy Supplier Obligations, supra note 63, at 1461. 
 82. See id. at 1464. 
 83. Vine & Hamrin, supra note 14, at 468. 
 84. As Robert Stavins has noted in reference to cap-and-trade programs, “where abatement 
costs are more uniform across sources, the political costs of enacting an allowance trading program are 
less likely to be justifiable.” Robert Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies: What Can We 
Learn from U.S. Experience (and Related Research)?, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 19, 28 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. 
Kolstad eds., 2007). 
 85. See Energy Supplier Obligations, supra note 63, at 1467; Where to Place the Saving Obliga-
tion, supra note 41, at 335. 
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might see more variation in marginal costs if the energy savings targets 
were more stringent, but as long as the targets are unambitious, the mar-
ginal cost of achieving the targets is likely to be uniform across firms. 
The European experience suggests that the impact of energy effi-
ciency markets on greenhouse gas emissions is modest. Some analysts 
have suggested that the programs have had local and regional benefits, 
such as avoiding construction of new transmission lines and lowering bills 
for low-income households, but the programs have not appeared to con-
tribute significantly to national and EU-wide climate change goals. In-
deed, the European Commission has consistently rejected proposals to 
institute an EU-wide energy efficiency market, principally because of the 
difficulty of scaling the markets across national borders.86 There would be 
significant objections, for example, if a French utility could fund energy 
efficiency upgrades in Sweden and then charge its French ratepayers for 
the cost.87 So after a decade of experience, the new market-based ap-
proach to energy efficiency remains confined to a handful of European 
nations. 
B. India’s Perform Achieve Trade Program 
India is implementing a different framework for an energy efficien-
cy market, one aimed not at energy suppliers and distributors as in Eu-
rope, but rather at energy end-users in the industrial sector. Under In-
dia’s PAT program, large industrial facilities are expected to achieve 
efficiency improvements, defined as energy used per unit of output, with-
in their own operations, with the goal of saving energy compared to 
business-as-usual projections.88 This market model differs significantly 
from the European model and raises its own challenges, particularly re-
garding estimation and verification of energy savings and transaction 
costs. 
Launched in 2012, PAT establishes energy efficiency targets and an 
ESCert trading market among 478 separate plants in eight industries: 
thermal power plants, fertilizer, cement, pulp and paper, textiles, chlor-
alkali, iron and steel, and aluminum.89 The program’s objective is to im-
prove energy efficiency in the industrial sector, which is the largest sector 
of energy consumption in India.90 Though the eight covered industries 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 49, at 50. 
 87. Id. at 40 (2009) (“The strong local benefits of energy savings projects . . . present the major 
difficulty related to the establishment of a Community-wide white certificate market.”).  
 88. Gupta, supra note 71, at 39. 
 89. The firms subject to PAT are concentrated in India’s industrial areas of Maharashtra, Raja-
sthan, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu. Forty-eight percent of all the plants subject to PAT are located in 
these four states. Id. at 40.  
 90. India has had various energy efficiency policy initiatives since the 1970s. The initiatives were 
originally aimed at energy security and reducing reliance on imports during the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
See Olivier Charnoz & Ashwini Swain, High Returns, Low Attention, Slow Implementation: The Policy 
Paradoxes of India’s Clean Energy Development 18 (Agence Française de Développement, Working Pa-
per No. 125, 2012), available at http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/ 
RECHERCHE/Scientifiques/Documents-de-travail/125-document-travail-VA.pdf. The PAT program 
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represent twenty-five percent of India’s annual GDP, they represent for-
ty-five percent of India’s total energy consumption.91 The program is 
aimed primarily at reducing fuel imports and improving the international 
competitiveness of industry, not at greenhouse gas reductions. Nonethe-
less, the Ministry of Power estimated that between 2012 and 2015, the 
program would avoid ninety-eight million tons of greenhouse gas emis-
sions that would otherwise have occurred.92 
While the European programs aim to save fixed amounts of energy, 
India’s program aims at energy efficiency, defined as energy consumed 
per unit of output by a firm.93 It does not guarantee any absolute level of 
energy savings. 
Improvements in energy efficiency could be achieved through a 
number of policy instruments, including raising energy taxes or subsidiz-
ing plant upgrades. India instead opted for a market-based trading policy 
to address the so-called “bandwidth” problem in Indian industry.94 The 
bandwidth problem refers to the fact that some Indian industrial firms 
are highly energy efficient, among the top performing firms in the world 
in terms of energy consumption per unit of output.95 Other firms in the 
same industry lag far behind, using double or even triple the amount of 
energy per unit of output as the top performing plants.96 In fast-growing 
industries such as steel or concrete, these laggard, energy-hogging firms 
remain in business because aggregate demand for materials is growing so 
quickly in India.97 Every available plant therefore operates at capacity, 
despite wide differences in their cost structure and their consumption of 
                                                                                                                                      
is an extension of earlier legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 2001, in which Parliament created a new 
Bureau of Energy Efficiency and mandated efficiency standards for appliances, energy consumption 
labeling, and energy audits of energy-intensive industries. See USAID, REPORT ON FINANCING 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDIA: A REVIEW OF CURRENT STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
INNOVATIVE MECHANISMS 17 (2013). Pre-existing law was crucial to the enactment of PAT. Since 
major industries in India were already subject to regular energy audits and reporting under the Energy 
Policy Act, PAT was seen as extension of existing law rather than a dramatic departure. See SANJAY 
DUBE ET AL., EMERGENT VENTURES INT’L, CAN THE LEARNINGS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES 
MAKE THE ‘PERFORM ACHIEVE AND TRADE (PAT) SCHEME’ PERFORM BETTER FOR INDIA 2 (2011). 
 91. DUBE ET AL., supra note 90. 
 92. WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF TRADING SCHEMES FOR ENERGY SAVINGS 
AND CARBON EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 40 (2013), available at https://www.thepmr.org/system/ 
files/documents/International%20Review%20of%20Certificate%20Trading%20Schemes%20v4%20fi
nal%20agreed.pdf. 
 93. Numerous studies have concluded that India has significant opportunities to use energy more 
efficiently as it builds out its housing, roads, industry, and other infrastructure in the next few decades. 
The Indian Ministry of Power has assessed the energy conservation potential of the economy at twen-
ty-three percent, meaning that India could produce the same GDP with twenty-three percent less en-
ergy if it implemented policy and technological changes. EUR. BUS. & TECH. CTR., ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN INDIA 2, http://www.ebtc.eu/pdf/111031_SNA_Snapshot_Energy-Efficiency-in-
India.pdf.  
 94. Albrecht Kaupp & Shashi Shekhar, Let’s Talk “Energy Efficiency + Energy Modesty”, 
ECEEE 2003 SUMMER STUDY 221, 224, available at http://www.eceee.org/library/conference_ 
proceedings/eceee_Summer_Studies/2003c/Panel_1/1193kaupp. 
 95. Id. at 223. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Ans Hariharasudhan, Construction Materials Market: Future Growth & Demand Drivers, 
PROJECT VENDOR (Oct. 10, 2014), http://projectvendor.com/construction-materials-market-future-
growth-demand-drivers. 
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energy. Under PAT’s trading structure, the marginal cost of efficiency 
upgrades is likely to vary widely, and the best-performing firms would be 
in a position to sell credits to the firms that operate antiquated plants. 
Whether India can pull off this ambitious program is an open ques-
tion.98 PAT faces many of the same design challenges for an energy effi-
ciency market that European nations face, and there are even greater 
transaction costs in the plant-by-plant measurement and verification sys-
tem that is at the heart of the PAT program. 
The mechanics are complex. For each of the 478 plants in the PAT 
program, the government set an energy efficiency target that the firm 
had to meet over the three-year period from 2012 to 2015.99 The individ-
ual plant targets (from one to three percent per year) were established as 
a target improvement in efficiency compared to that plant’s baseline en-
ergy efficiency, which was assessed over the three-year period from 2007 
to 2010.100 In early 2015, the energy consumption of each plant was meas-
ured to determine whether the plant surpassed its target and should be 
awarded ESCerts or whether the plant had fallen short of its target.101 
In contrast to the European programs, with their off-the-shelf 
standardized set of efficiency upgrades, the PAT program is bespoke: 
each firm can customize the efficiency investments it wants to make with-
in its own operations. There is no “deemed” energy savings from a 
standard menu of technological upgrades. Instead, the Indian plants can 
reach their targets through any mechanism they want, including equip-
ment upgrades, changes in manufacturing processes, or fundamental 
changes to the plant.102 They can also choose not to make any changes 
and purchase ESCerts on the market instead.103 Compared to the Euro-
pean programs, PAT puts a much wider range of technologies and prac-
tices into play for achieving improvements in efficiency. 
The drawback of this approach, however, is that the changes in en-
ergy consumption at each plant must be measured in the field, through ex 
post auditing at the end of each program period, rather than the ex ante 
deemed savings approach. This is a substantial task for the 478 plants in 
the program, and this approach raises significant concerns about addi-
                                                                                                                                      
 98. See Deepa Badrinarayana, The Kyoto Protocol’s Emissions Trading Scheme: Realistic or Un-
just Solution for Potential Developing Country Signatories?, 42 ENVT. L. REP. 11157, 11164 (question-
ing India’s readiness and capability to implement market-based emissions trading domestically).  
 99. NEELAM SINGH, WORLD RES. INST., CREATING MARKET SUPPORT FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY: INDIA’S PERFORM, ACHIEVE AND TRADE SCHEME 1–2 (2013), available at http://r4d. 
dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/CDKN/India-PAT_InsideStory.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 2; see also SAURABH DIDDI, BUREAU OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, MARKET BASED 
MECHANISM 13, https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/India_Market_Mechanism_Promote 
_EE%26Renewables.pdf.  
 101. See IN-2: Perform Achieve Trade Scheme (PAT Scheme), INDUS. EFFICIENCY POL’Y 
DATABASE, http://iepd.iipnetwork.org/policy/perform-achieve-trade-scheme-pat-scheme (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2016). 
 102. Rajesh Kumar & Arun Agarwala, A Sustainable Energy Efficiency Solution in Power Plant 
by Implementation of Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) Mechanism, 2 OPEN J. ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
154, 154 (2013), available at http://file.scirp.org/pdf/OJEE_2013102514064939.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 159. 
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tionality—whether the program is crediting improvements in energy effi-
ciency that would have occurred anyway at the plant. Moreover, the en-
ergy measurements at each plant will be conducted by a network of 
third-party auditors,104 raising the possibility of corruption in the pro-
gram. In India, corruption in environmental law enforcement is ram-
pant.105 These monitoring and verification challenges will become even 
more complex if India follows through on plans to expand PAT to addi-
tional plants and industries. 
IV. PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
MARKETS  
As this discussion of the European and Indian programs suggests, 
energy efficiency markets are complex and require substantial govern-
mental oversight to ensure that claimed energy savings have actually oc-
curred. Under both the European model (covering energy suppliers and 
distributors) and the Indian model (covering energy end-users), it is clear 
that there are several hurdles to establishing effective, credible energy 
efficiency markets. The idealized vision of tradable permits, which pre-
dicts that trading will allow obligated firms to achieve an environmental 
goal at lower cost than traditional mandates, runs into several practical 
obstacles in the context of energy efficiency. 
In this Part, I focus on three major problems of institutional design 
in energy efficiency markets: ensuring additionality, setting an environ-
mentally meaningful savings target, and maintaining a system boundary. 
Together, these problems present a formidable set of challenges. They 
call into question the desirability of using tradable permits in this area of 
environmental law. 
A. The Problem of Ensuring Additionality 
The most pressing problem of institutional design is how to ensure 
additionality in energy efficiency markets—that is, how to award ES-
Certs only for real, verifiable energy savings that are additional to what 
firms would have achieved anyway in the absence of the programs. A 
failure to ensure additionality will undermine trust in the market by the 
public and by market participants, yet the transaction costs associated 
with accurately measuring energy savings are substantial.106 Failure to en-
                                                                                                                                      
 104. Id. at 158–59.  
 105. See SAT SHARMA, CORRUPT INEPT RUDDERLESS POLITICIANS: IMPEDIMENTS TO INDIA’S 
MARCH FORWARD (2014); Michael Faure et al., Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Envi-
ronmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 95, 99–100 (2010) (“Although coun-
tries such as India, Columbia, and Costa Rica have registered modest successes, environmental regula-
tion in developing countries has remained a dead letter, unimplemented and unenforced.”); M.C. 
Mehta, The Accountability Principle: Legal Solutions to Break Corruption’s Impact on India’s Envi-
ronment, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 141 (2006).  
 106. ENERGY SAVINGS CREDITS, supra note 39, at 31 (noting that the transaction costs associated 
with measuring energy savings have “certainly hampered the implementation of [energy efficiency] 
trading”). 
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sure additionality also undermines the environmental goals of the pro-
gram because in an ESCert market, firms that do not reach their energy 
savings or energy efficiency targets can purchase ESCerts to make up the 
difference. If those ESCerts, purporting to represent additional energy 
savings, were instead issued for energy savings that would have occurred 
anyway, then the trading program will actually weaken the underlying 
energy savings goals of the jurisdiction.107 
Additionality in the context of ESCerts can be defined as “the certi-
fication of genuine and durable increases in the level of energy efficiency 
beyond what would have occurred in the absence of energy efficiency in-
tervention.”108 To ensure additionality, regulators must avoid double 
counting efficiency improvements created by other programs (such as tax 
breaks for installing efficient appliances or other equipment), and they 
must also ensure that the ESCerts are additional to background im-
provements in energy efficiency being experienced in particular indus-
tries or in the economy as a whole.109 
For several reasons, additionality is particularly difficult to ensure in 
energy efficiency markets. First, energy efficiency is often profitable. 
Even without ESCert programs, firms strive to reduce their energy con-
sumption per unit of output for competitive reasons, and households and 
businesses similarly look for energy savings (such as installing compact 
fluorescent light bulbs or efficient air conditioners).110 To be sure, the lev-
el of energy efficiency investment is widely seen to be suboptimal, but 
even without ESCert trading programs, firms and households invest bil-
lions of dollars annually in equipment and practices that can reduce their 
fuel and electricity costs.111 If a regulator awards ESCerts for energy sav-
ings that the claimant would have pursued anyway, for its own reasons, 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. For further discussion of the role of additionality in market-based environmental policies, 
see JOE LOPER ET AL., DEAL OR NO DEAL? PROS AND CONS OF TRADING UNDER AN ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARD, 2008 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN 
BLDGS. 5-183 (2008) [hereinafter DEAL OR NO DEAL?]. See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmen-
tal Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 33–34 & n.168 (2000) (noting that pri-
vate parties’ sale of credits for emissions reductions that they are required to make anyway under oth-
er laws could weaken performance of an emission trading program); Matthew Ranson & Robert N. 
Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems, 13 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 409 (2013) (explaining that if regulated firms can purchase credits from emissions 
reduction projects that would have occurred anyway, aggregate emissions may increase or they may 
decrease to a lesser degree than in absence of such projects). 
 108. TRADABLE CERTIFICATES, supra note 17, at 59; see also Mundaca, Markets for Energy Effi-
ciency, supra note 15, at 3021. 
 109. As energy policy scholars Ole Langniss and Barbara Praetorius have explained, regulators 
must “take into account likely changes in relevant regulation and laws, the trend in autonomous effi-
ciency improvements and changes of other basic variables such as the development of markets for 
products of the project . . . .” Langniss & Praetorius, supra note 15, at 207 (internal citation omitted). 
 110. See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 8, 9, 12 (discussing the multiple reasons why firms 
strive to reduce their energy consumption); see also Carolyn Fischer, Project-based Mechanisms for 
Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-offs with Baselines, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 1807, 1808–09 (2005); 
Langniss & Praetorius, supra note 15, at 208 (discussing the difficulty of determining whether energy 
consumption reduction would have occurred anyway). 
 111. In 2012, for example, global investments in energy efficiency were $310 to $360 billion. INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY MARKET REPORT 2014: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2014), 
available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/EEMR2014SUM.pdf. 
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then the regulator is granting a valuable credit that does not represent 
the true energy savings spurred by the program.112 
Second, additionality is difficult to ensure in ESCert programs be-
cause there is a natural rate of improvement in energy efficiency over 
time due to technological advancement and productivity improvements. 
Energy consumed per unit of GDP has been declining throughout the 
developed world since the 1970s.113 Nations are getting better at produc-
ing goods and services with fewer energy inputs because of improve-
ments in technology, a shift from heavy manufacturing to services, ad-
vances in materials science, changes in capital markets, more efficient 
motors and building design, and a host of other reasons.114 Energy con-
sumption may decline in a utility’s service area for a variety of reasons, 
including improvements in technology, better buildings, unusually warm 
winters, fluctuations in energy prices, or even a recession.115 Market par-
ticipants, therefore, should be required to demonstrate that the energy 
savings they are claiming (even if accurately verified) have occurred be-
cause of the ESCert trading program rather than from these other 
“background” factors in the economy. 
Third, some efficiency improvement occurs in industrial firms due 
to natural turnover of capital stock. Consider a steel manufacturing plant 
that replaces an outdated, 1970s boiler with a modern, efficient one, and 
therefore surpasses its government-set energy efficiency target under an 
ESCert program. In an energy efficiency market similar to PAT—one 
that focuses on energy end-users—the steel manufacturer may earn ES-
Certs worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. The additionality problem 
is that the boiler would have to be replaced at some point in the near fu-
ture even in the absence of the program. There is a strong argument that 
the energy efficiency gain the firm has experienced is not additional, and 
an ESCert award would be an illegitimate “anyway” credit.116 
                                                                                                                                      
 112. See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 22 (questioning public acceptance of ESCert pro-
grams because the programs involve firms undertaking energy efficiency upgrades to save money “and 
then turning around and selling the proof of that savings for yet more income.”).  
 113. Howard Geller & Sophie Attali, The Experience with Energy Efficiency Policies and Pro-
grammes in IEA countries: Learning from the Critics, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, at 3 (2005), available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/IEAEnergyPolicies_Learning_from_criti
cs.pdf.  
 114. See generally Sebastian Voigt et al., Energy Intensity Developments in 40 Major Economies: 
Structural Change or Technology Improvement?, 41 ENERGY ECON. 47 (2014) (discussing reasons for 
the decline in energy intensity in major economies).  
 115. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, An Empirical Analysis of Energy Intensity and Its Determinants at the 
State Level, 29 ENERGY J. 1, 6–17 (2008) (studying energy consumption in forty-six U.S. states and 
discussing state-to-state variations in weather, income, and energy prices); see also Feng Song & Xinye 
Zheng, What Drives the Change in China’s Energy Intensity: Combining Decomposition Analysis and 
Econometric Analysis at the Provincial Level, 51 ENERGY P. 445, 449 (2012) (stating that variables in 
energy price, income, capital, investment, and urbanization influence differences in energy intensity in 
China's provinces). 
 116. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Poten-
tial, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1797 (2008) (discussing “anyway” credits in the context of the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism).  
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Finally, additionality is difficult to ensure because most countries 
have multiple policies and incentives in place to encourage household, 
commercial, and industrial efficiency.117 Common policies include tax 
credits, product subsidies, government procurement requirements, effi-
cient building codes, and research and development subsidies.118 All of 
these policies affect the baseline against which the ESCert credit is being 
issued. So, for example, if a utility relies on ESCerts to reach its energy 
savings target, and the ESCerts were generated by installing insulation or 
highly efficient appliances in residences, the credit will not be additional 
if the homeowners would have likely installed the same insulation or ap-
pliances due to other policy incentives.119 
In short, there are many reasons why an ESCert, purporting to rep-
resent energy savings achieved by a firm, may overestimate the savings 
and thereby undermine the credibility of the market. Lack of additionali-
ty has been the Achilles heel of other offset programs.120 The CDM, for 
example, has been heavily criticized for its failure to ensure additionality. 
Scholars have documented that project developers have gamed the sys-
tem by obtaining credits for greenhouse gas reductions that probably 
would have occurred anyway.121 Michael Wara and David Victor showed, 
for example, that nearly all non–coal energy development projects in 
China received CDM credits, which makes sense only if one unrealisti-
cally assumes that no natural gas or renewable electricity generation 
would have been developed in China without the CDM credits.122 Anoth-
er study of CDM projects in India concluded that while project develop-
ers did attempt to document additionality in their applications for cred-
its, the auditing firms accredited by the CDM Executive Board simply 
took the applications at face value. They were not “able or willing to 
thoroughly check” that the claims of additionality had evidence to back 
them up.123 
Compared to the scholarship on additionality in carbon markets, 
there has been far less scholarship on additionality in energy efficiency 
markets, but the programs appear equally vulnerable to double-counting 
and flawed estimation of credits. Just as in the CDM, neither the seller 
                                                                                                                                      
 117. See DEAL OR NO DEAL?, supra note 107, at 5-190.  
 118. See id. 
 119. See Mundaca, Markets for Energy Efficiency, supra note 15, at 3020.  
 120. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 25, at 46–49. 
 121. See Wara, supra note 116, at 1789 (describing gaming of the CDM and identifying it as a sig-
nificant problem with the CDM market); Steven Ferrey, Cubing the Kyoto Protocol: Post-Copenhagen 
Regulatory Reforms to Reset the Global Thermostat, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 343, 350 (2010) 
(stating that errors in verification of offsets, including those issued under the Clean Development 
Mechanism, represent a major disadvantage in the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol); McNish, supra 
note 31, at 391 (criticizing offset mechanisms such as the CDM).  
 122. Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon 
Offsets 13–14 (Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008), 
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf. 
 123. AXEL MICHAELOWA & PALLAV PUROHIT, INST. FOR POLITICAL SCI., UNIV. OF ZURICH, 
DISCUSSION PAPER CDM-1, ADDITIONALITY DETERMINATION OF INDIAN CDM PROJECTS: CAN 
INDIAN CDM PROJECT DEVELOPERS OUTWIT THE CDM EXECUTIVE BOARD? 13 (2007), available at 
http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/additionality-cdm-india-cs-version9-07.pdf. 
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nor the buyer of an ESCert has any incentive to ensure that the credit 
represents real, verified, additional energy savings.124 The seller has an 
incentive to overstate energy savings to earn ESCerts, and the buyer, 
which is using the certificates for compliance purposes, would not typi-
cally care about the accuracy of the estimates used to generate the certif-
icates. The market structure makes regulators the sole entity responsible 
for maintaining the integrity of the ESCerts. The probity of regulators 
(and third-party energy auditors) is all that stands between the integrity 
of the programs and the certification of bogus energy savings.125 
Indeed, there are some signs that the existing energy efficiency 
markets in Europe and India are encountering additionality problems. 
The ex ante approach of the European programs, based on deemed sav-
ings, ostensibly simplifies energy savings accounting and crediting, but it 
does not avoid problems of additionality. The issue is that some of the 
energy savings that utilities are claiming for ESCerts would have oc-
curred anyway. In Italy, for example, utilities have distributed millions of 
compact fluorescent light bulbs to their customers, earning ex ante credits 
for ESCerts.126 Many of these customers would have purchased these 
bulbs on their own, however, as consumers have done in the United 
States and elsewhere.127 Moreover, there is no verification in Italy to en-
sure that customers are actually using the bulbs that were distributed.128 
In France, where utilities have earned ESCerts for installing efficient 
boilers, heat pumps, insulation, and windows for their customers, those 
same items are also eligible for homeowner tax credits.129 Homeowners 
may have ultimately undertaken these projects anyway, even without 
utility funding or assistance. A comprehensive review of the programs in 
Europe concluded that the additionality of the efficiency projects used to 
generate ESCerts “has not been clear.”130 
India’s PAT market is also prone to double-counting and addition-
ality problems. Because the ESCerts are issued on an ex post basis, at the 
end of each program cycle, it may seem that regulators would be well po-
sitioned to ensure that energy savings have actually materialized. But 
there is no attempt in the PAT program to document what portion of a 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. See McNish, supra note 31, at 428.  
 125. Id. 
 126. See Where to Place the Saving Obligation, supra note 41, at 331. 
 127. See JOE LOPER ET AL., ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, SCALING-UP ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROGRAMS: THE MEASUREMENT CHALLENGE 12–14 (2010), available at http://www.ase.org/sites/ase. 
org/files/energy_measurement_challenge_0.pdf. 
 128. See SILVIA REZESSY & PAOLO BERTOLDI, ENERGY SUPPLIER OBLIGATIONS AND WHITE 
CERTIFICATE SCHEMES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010 
ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BLDGS. 8-308 (2010) (“[T]he extent to which the 
CFLs are actually used remains unclear and hence the actual amount of savings achieved in reality.”). 
 129. See id. at 8-305. See also GIRAUDET & FINON, supra note 17, at 14 (“[F]or many energy effi-
ciency measures [in France] . . . the same invoice can be used by customers to claim for a fiscal subsidy 
and by obliged suppliers to claim for white certificates.”); id. at 22 (“In France, the specific effect of 
the scheme on technology diffusion is difficult to isolate, because of the overlap with the tax credit 
scheme.”). 
 130. BERTOLDI & REZESSY,  supra note 49, at 308.  
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firm’s improvement in energy efficiency is due to the program and what 
portion would have occurred anyway due to background improvements 
in the technology or other factors discussed above. Energy auditors in-
stead simply assess each regulated plant’s energy consumption at the be-
ginning and the end of each program cycle and divide the total energy 
consumed by the plant’s output to get a measure of improvements in en-
ergy efficiency.131 The additionality problem is that regulators will award 
ESCerts to plants that surpass their target, even though some improve-
ment in efficiency would likely have occurred anyway.132 
B. The Problem of Setting the Energy Savings Target 
The second major problem with the design of energy efficiency 
markets is that the energy savings targets (or energy efficiency targets) 
have been unambitious, closely paralleling what industries and utilities 
were achieving on their own. If the targets are too lax, then ESCert trad-
ing prices will remain low and the program will hardly be worth the ef-
fort. The largest potential advantage of ESCert programs is that they al-
low trading among firms with different marginal costs of compliance, 
reducing the overall cost of achieving energy savings. But that advantage 
disappears if the target is too lax and all firms have essentially the same 
marginal costs of compliance. 
Scholars of market-based instruments in environmental law have 
paid insufficient attention to this central issue of target setting.133 The 
emphasis in the literature is on the trading aspect of these programs, ra-
ther than on the initial governmental responsibility of setting the pro-
gram’s target.134 But the government-established target is at the core of 
most market-based environmental policies. The target determines the ul-
timate ambition and environmental results of the program. The target 
determines the scarcity of the traded good and therefore its selling price. 
From the standpoint of the environment, the stringency of the energy 
savings target matters far more than the trading aspects of these pro-
grams.135 
In energy efficiency markets established to date, regulators have of-
ten set weak energy savings or efficiency targets that fail to establish 
scarcity in the market for ESCerts. The unambitious targets instead ap-
proximate business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency. In India, 
for example, the PAT program aimed for overall 5.8% gains in energy 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. See SINGH, supra note 99, at 2. 
 132. See S. P. GARNAIK, BUREAU OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, PERFORM, ACHIEVE & TRADE 
(PAT), BEE EXPERIENCE 12, available at www.iipnetwork.org/PAT-ppt_BEE%20Doc%209.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 133. See The Overallocation Problem, supra note 25, at 398 (“Remarkably, there is little written 
on the topic of how caps in cap-and-trade programs should be set.”). 
 134. See David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon, 40 ENVTL L. 1, 11 (2010) [hereinafter Capping Car-
bon] (describing a “vast economic literature on emissions trading that said little or nothing about set-
ting caps, focusing instead on the effects of allowing trading.”). 
 135. See id. at 4–5.  
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efficiency in the eight covered industries over three years, between 2012 
and 2015, but the energy efficiency of Indian industry was already im-
proving at an annual rate of 1.5% before PAT took effect.136 The PAT 
targets were only slightly more stringent than what Indian industries had 
been achieving, on average, on their own. 
To be sure, regulators could increase target stringency over time, 
but there are a variety of political pressures that tend to militate against 
more ambitious target setting. Indeed, lax targets in these programs are 
not an aberration. Rather, they reflect a larger trend of over-allocation 
and insufficient stringency in many market-based policies in environmen-
tal law. 
In cap-and-trade programs, for example, Leslie McAllister has doc-
umented numerous examples of weak caps that require little change in 
behavior from regulated industries, drawing examples from the U.S. ac-
id-rain program, California’s RECLAIM program, and the European 
Emissions Trading System (“ETS”).137 Weak caps lead to a lack of scarci-
ty in the market for the tradable permit or allowance, and there is a cor-
respondingly weak price signal for firms to change their behavior. Be-
cause of weak caps in the ETS, for example, allowance prices have 
remained below seven euros per ton of carbon dioxide for over two 
years,138 far below expectations, and the ETS is now widely derided as 
“lifeless”139 and “moribund.”140 With weak program targets, the supposed 
advantages of market-based policies in environmental law evaporate. 
Without a strong price signal, for example, the market will fail to incen-
tivize deep reductions in pollution, and regulated firms will make “few, if 
any, emissions reductions from business-as-usual emissions.”141 Moreo-
ver, lax program targets and weak price signals will fail to spur the tech-
nology innovation that is touted as one of the primary benefits of mar-
ket-based approaches to environmental law.142 
What explains the pattern of weak caps and program targets in mul-
tiple market-based environmental programs? The most likely explana-
tion is that the weak caps and targets reflect the politics of enacting and 
overseeing these programs. To launch a market-based environmental 
program and win industry cooperation for its passage, the focus is often 
on the expected private costs of the program rather than the environ-
                                                                                                                                      
 136. See GARNIAK, supra note 132.  
 137. See The Overallocation Problem, supra note 25, at 398–410. 
 138. For historical trends in EU ETS allowance prices, see Carbon Emissions Futures, 
INVESTING.COM, http://www.investing.com/commodities/carbon-emissions-streaming-chart (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2016). 
 139. Christian Oliver & Pilita Clark, EU Plans to Revive Lifeless Carbon Market, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2014, 8:10 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/23d2b622-4fce-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de.html# 
axzz45UFR9FAn.  
 140. EU Trading Market Collapses, Coal Cheap as Dirt, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 17, 2013), http:// 
www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/executive-insight/eu-carbon-trading-
collapses-coal-cheap-as-dirt/article11311111/.  
 141. The Overallocation Problem, supra note 25, at 397. 
 142. See Driesen, supra note 24, at 436 (arguing that cap-and-trade provides few, if any, incentives 
for expensive technological innovation); Taylor, supra note 24, at 4804. 
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mental goals.143 Therefore, regulators have an incentive to enact weak 
program targets to lower the overall cost for industry. Moreover, in cap-
and-trade programs, regulated industries tend to lobby for weak caps 
that ensure that allowance prices will remain reasonable even if demand 
for the allowances runs high. If this high demand scenario does not actu-
ally materialize, however, the program ends up over-allocating allowanc-
es, with corresponding low prices and limited environmental effective-
ness.144 
Another explanation for the pattern of weak program targets in 
market-based environmental policies is that the targets reflect cautious 
judgments by regulators about the technical feasibility for firms to reach 
the target. In setting a target for a market-based program, regulators 
must ask themselves: how much improvement can we realistically require 
of regulated firms? This judgment is inevitably shaped by the state of 
available technology, by politics, and by the need to get continuing coop-
eration from firms for the program. 
Market advocates frequently claim that market-based instruments 
obviate the need for regulators to make these kinds of decisions about 
technological feasibility.145 Nearly thirty years ago, Richard Stewart and 
Bruce Ackerman argued that emissions trading avoids the defects inher-
ent in having regulators set technology-based pollution control standards 
for individual facilities, a task that they claimed involves massive infor-
mation gathering challenges and adversarial contests over the appropri-
ate standard.146 Stewart and Ackerman’s view—that market-based poli-
cies avoid the need for regulators to set technology-based standards—has 
since become conventional wisdom.147 
Market proponents overlook, however, that in setting the appropri-
ate cap or target for a market-based environmental program, regulators 
are confronted with decisions on technological feasibility that are similar 
to those they face in enacting traditional, prescriptive environmental 
                                                                                                                                      
 143. See McAllister, The Overallocation Problem, supra note 25, at 426. 
 144. See id. at 436. 
 145. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1336–37, 1342 (1985) (noting that the tradable permit system they propose would 
eliminate “most of the information-processing tasks [involving technology-based standards] that are 
presently overwhelming federal and state bureaucracies.”).  
 146. Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case 
for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 179 (1988). 
 147. See e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 39n.5 (1998) (noting the problems with technology-based regulation and arguing that agencies 
cause “technolog[y] lock-in” through regulation); Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era of En-
viornmental Law, 41 S.C. L. REV. 733 (1990) (challenging the premises of “command and control” 
regulation and discussing market-based alternatives); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketa-
ble Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989); Andrew P. Moriss et al., 
Principles for Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335 (2002) (arguing for the superiority of market-based ap-
proaches to water law); Richard Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Ver-
sus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547 (1992) (arguing for the use of market-
based incentives rather than “command-and-control regulation”); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Consti-
tutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (1996) (arguing that technolo-
gy-based mandates provide little incentive for innovation). 
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regulations.148 Indeed, as David Driesen has explained, because regula-
tors develop emissions trading programs with close attention to the level 
of environmental improvement that is technologically and economically 
feasible for firms, “emissions trading often becomes a form of [technolo-
gy-based regulation], rather than an alternative to it.”149 Market-based 
environmental policies do provide firms with flexibility to decide how 
they will achieve an environmental goal, but market-based policies do 
not avoid the central problem that regulators face in enacting any new 
environmental program: deciding how much environmental improve-
ment can feasibly be demanded, in aggregate, from the regulated firms. 
In ESCert trading markets, target setting is complex and politically 
fraught for regulators. Should regulators require utilities to achieve a six 
percent reduction in energy consumption in their service areas over five 
years, or a ten or fifteen percent reduction? What would happen if the 
target is too strict and ESCerts trade at a price that begins to become no-
ticeable on customer bills? Evidence suggests that regulators are reluc-
tant to set ambitious targets for ESCert trading markets and often re-
quire business-as-usual reductions in energy consumption, or some small 
additional percentage just beyond business as usual.150 These small, in-
cremental steps limit the potential of energy efficiency markets to make a 
substantial contribution to climate change goals. 
Target-setting in energy efficiency markets becomes particularly 
complex if regulators go beyond setting broad energy savings goals for a 
region or an industry to setting narrowly tailored goals for individual fa-
cilities. In India’s PAT Program, for example, many firms protested that 
a single numeric target for improvement in energy efficiency for a given 
industry would be unfair because it would penalize early movers.151 That 
is, facilities that had already made significant investments in energy effi-
ciency would be asked to make the same percentage improvement in en-
ergy efficiency as antiquated, poorly-performing plants. In response to 
this concern, the Bureau of Energy Efficiency agreed to set individual 
energy efficiency improvement targets for each of the 478 plants in the 
program, a task that added greatly to the complexity of the program.152 
The need for individuation in target setting suggests how complicat-
ed target-setting could become if energy efficiency markets were ex-
                                                                                                                                      
 148. See Emissions Trading, supra note 67, at 329 (noting that market mechanisms raise “the usu-
al issues that arise in a traditional regulation, such as how costly reductions will be, how much benefit 
they will yield, and whether they are technologically achievable.”).  
 149. Capping Carbon, supra note 134, at 6. 
 150. See ENERGY SAVINGS CREDITS, supra note 39, at 24, 26 (noting that many states in the U.S. 
have established energy savings mandates for utilities that “do not drive energy savings significantly 
beyond business-as-usual” and that a significant increase in these mandates would make them “politi-
cally less palatable”). 
 151. Piyush Verma et al., India’s Initiatives on Improving Energy Efficiency in Aluminium Indus-
tries, 1 ASIA-PAC. J. ENERGY & ENV’T 215, 217 (2014). 
 152. CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, BALANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND INDUSTRIAL 
GROWTH: A MARKET-BASED, GROWTH-FRIENDLY SOLUTION 2 (2012), available at http://ccap. 
org/assets/CCAP-Booklet_India_PAT.pdf; Gerard Wynn, Markets Can Boost Energy Efficiency Pro-
jects, ARAB NEWS (Sept. 3, 2012) www.arabnews.com/markets-can-boost-energy-efficiency-projects. 
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panded to thousands of actors in various industries, as many advocates 
have championed. To deploy tradable ESCerts as a tool for energy effi-
ciency across a whole economy, regulators would need to determine rea-
sonable, technologically feasible energy savings targets for thousands of 
individual facilities. They would then need to measure and verify energy 
consumption at those facilities and reward those facilities that surpass 
their target. This is a mammoth undertaking on a national scale. 
C. The Problem of Defining the System Boundary 
A final problem with establishing markets for energy efficiency is 
defining the system boundary—the question of how regulators should 
define the geographic boundary of a participating firm, region, or facility. 
In any environmental regulatory program, there is the potential that 
regulated firms in the jurisdiction will choose to relocate outside the ju-
risdiction. There is also a risk that non–regulated firms outside the juris-
diction will gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis regulated firms in the 
jurisdiction. The issue of geographic boundaries is particularly pressing in 
climate-change programs because of the global nature of the problem. If 
major sources of greenhouse gas emissions react to one jurisdiction’s cli-
mate-mitigation policies by relocating outside the geographic boundaries 
of regulation—the problem of “carbon leakage”—then the enacting ju-
risdiction’s environmental goals will be severely undermined.153 The 
greenhouse gases will simply be emitted outside the boundary of regula-
tion. 
Energy efficiency markets are prone to a similar problem, which I 
call “energy savings leakage.” The issue is that energy savings ostensibly 
achieved in one location may prove to be ephemeral because energy-
intensive activities have simply relocated elsewhere, leading to no net re-
duction in energy consumption. Energy savings leakage has not been 
well explored in the existing literature on ESCert markets, but it could 
be a significant limitation on the scope of the programs, and further em-
pirical research is necessary to document the scope of the problem. 
In an ESCert trading program, the extent of energy savings leakage 
depends on the design of the market. Leakage is not likely to be signifi-
cant under the European model of energy efficiency markets, where a 
limited number of energy suppliers and distributors conduct efficiency 
upgrades in residential and commercial facilities. The programs are na-
tional in scope, and it is unlikely that a utility would relocate its business 
simply because of new energy savings mandates. Any utility that finds it 
expensive to perform energy efficiency upgrades will simply purchase 
                                                                                                                                      
 153. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ISSUES BEHIND COMPETITIVENESS AND CARBON LEAKAGE 3 
(2008) (defining carbon leakage as “the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the 
country (as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission reductions in the 
sector.”); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 499, 503 (2009); Neil Peretz, Carbon Leakage Under the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Is It A Major Policy Concern?, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 60 (2009). 
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ESCerts and pay any penalty, rather than fundamentally adjust its busi-
ness operations. 
Energy savings leakage could become a significant problem, howev-
er, under energy efficiency markets like India’s PAT program, where en-
ergy end-users are expected to make efficiency upgrades within their 
own operations. The concern is that firms could achieve improvements in 
energy efficiency and earn valuable ESCerts by outsourcing their energy-
intensive operations to other firms that are not regulated in the market. 
A textile plant, for example, could improve its energy efficiency simply 
by outsourcing its dyeing operation elsewhere. The plant would show the 
same annual output of textiles with far lower energy consumption, sug-
gesting that it has improved its energy efficiency, even though in reality it 
has simply outsourced part of its operation. 
Because this model of an energy efficiency market measures energy 
consumption within the fence-line of a particular facility, it is all too easy 
to game the system: simply contract out, wherever possible, the energy 
intensive parts of a production line.154 If this is done after the firm’s base-
line energy efficiency has already been measured, then any firm can 
make it appear that it has achieved dramatic improvements in energy ef-
ficiency.155 
Market enthusiasts are overlooking this important structural con-
straint on the energy efficiency markets: it matters a great deal how regu-
lators define the “facility” to be measured.156 If, as advocates suggest, 
thousands of entities could participate in a single market by seeking out 
opportunities to save energy and selling those energy savings to other 
participants, the problem of defining the “facility” to be measured and 
monitored becomes intractable. What would it mean to claim that a cer-
tain industry, plant, or building has achieved energy savings compared to 
some baseline? How would regulators delineate the boundary of the fa-
cility to be measured? With dynamic economies, low-cost shipping, and 
an infinite ability for any facility to contract out operations, the account-
ing challenge is clear. Simply measuring the amount of energy that has 
been consumed within some physical perimeter is insufficient. To main-
tain a credible system boundary in an energy efficiency market, regula-
tors would need to monitor not only how much energy was used by a fa-
cility at the beginning and end of a program period, but also the process 
                                                                                                                                      
 154. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 25, at 46 (exploring ways that baseline-credit systems can be 
“gamed” to the advantage of regulated entities).  
 155. Taylor, supra note 24, at 4804 (noting that carbon leakage can also occur if “policy-
makers . . . may decide to count emissions reductions in uncapped areas or economic sectors as ‘off-
sets’ for unrealized emissions reductions within a capped region or sector.”). 
 156. India has adopted a “gate-to-gate” accounting concept that examines efficiency improve-
ments within the physical perimeter of the plant. See Rajesh Kumar & Arun Agarwala, A Sustainable 
Energy Efficiency Solution in Power Plant by Implementation of Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) 
Mechanism, 2 OPEN J. ENERGY EFFICIENCY 154, 157 (2013), available at http://file.scirp.org/ 
pdf/OJEE_2013102514064939.pdf (discussing the gate-to-gate concept and the definition of plant 
boundaries). Gate-to-gate accounting simplifies measurement of energy consumption, but it cannot 
account for changes in operations in which energy-intensive parts of a plant’s operations are out-
sourced to other firms that are outside the perimeter of the facility being measured.  
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changes that occurred within the facility during that period. This increas-
es both the intrusiveness of the programs and governmental monitoring 
costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Improving energy efficiency is critical for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, but as this Article demonstrates, policymakers seeking to har-
ness tradable permits for energy efficiency goals face a number of chal-
lenging obstacles. Energy efficiency markets are complex—an “elaborate 
instrument” 157 that requires substantial government oversight—and they 
are hampered by persistent problems of measurement and verification. 
As a tool for climate change mitigation, the markets established to date 
have had only modest results. Although governments have been experi-
menting with energy efficiency markets for a decade, the markets remain 
operational in only a few countries, and they have not made a significant 
impact on the greenhouse gas emissions profiles of the countries that 
have adopted them. India’s Perform Achieve Trade program is a new 
policy with substantially different parameters from the European pro-
grams, and it remains to be seen whether India’s model—a national en-
ergy efficiency trading market involving industrial firms—can achieve 
verified improvements in energy efficiency with acceptable transaction 
costs. 
The experience with energy efficiency markets underscores that 
tradable permits are not a panacea for achieving environmental goals. 
Indeed, if the programs are poorly designed, without adequate attention 
to verification and additionality, tradable permits can actually undermine 
environmental goals by allowing firms to avoid required environmental 
improvements by purchasing credits that do not represent real environ-
mental improvements elsewhere. Tradable permits, moreover, do not 
avoid the need for regulators to make difficult choices on technological 
feasibility, target setting, and maintaining system boundaries. 
The problems identified in this Article should not detract from the 
importance of improving energy efficiency to address climate change. 
Numerous studies have identified energy efficiency as one of the cheap-
est way to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.158 The policy toolbox to 
improve energy efficiency includes many approaches, including infor-
mation disclosure, government procurement, building codes, vehicle 
standards, energy taxes, and utility demand response programs. Tradable 
permit programs are not an essential part of the energy efficiency policy 
mix. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 157. Nicholas Labanca & Adriaan Perrels, Editorial: Tradable White Certificates—A Promising 
but Tricky Policy Instrument, 1 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 233 (2008). 
 158. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CAPTURING THE MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 18 (2014); MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 2; RUSSELL ET AL., ACEEE, RECOGNIZING 
THE VALUE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY’S MULTIPLE BENEFITS 12–14 (2015).  
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